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Trends in Communist Propaganda

30 Apr 75

No. 17

**Confidential**

**FBIS**

# **TRENDS**

**In Communist Propaganda**

**Confidential**

30 APRIL 1975  
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## VIETNAM

Following the unconditional surrender of the Government of South Vietnam by President Duong Van Minh on 30 April, Vietnamese communist broadcasts have triumphantly acclaimed the fall of Saigon and publicized a series of communiques from the communist military command, various Saigon organizations, and the municipal "revolutionary committee." These communiques and comments were broadcast by Hanoi and Liberation Radio, quickly joined some five hours after the surrender by the seized Saigon transmitter, now identified as the "liberated Saigon broadcasting radio, the Voice of the Saigon-Gia Dinh People," which linked its broadcasts in parallel with Liberation Radio for extensive periods. The PLAF Command communique echoed policies the communists have propounded for other "liberated areas," calling for civil order and an end to resistance and urging officers, soldiers, police, and civil servants to "return to the people." The media also publicized an appeal from the "people's revolutionary committee" for the southern Mekong Delta area which urged the capitulation of soldiers and civilians in areas not yet controlled by communist forces.

The initial Vietnamese communist commentary on the fall of Saigon, broadcast repeatedly by the three radios, jubilantly described the hoisting of PRG flags throughout Saigon and recalled that the South Vietnamese capital had been given the name "City of Ho Chi Minh" following the August Revolution in 1945. The commentary confirmed that the final communist advance on the city--in an operation also code-named "Ho Chi Minh"--had begun on 26 April. It was on this same day that communist media had broadcast an intransigent PRG statement which had closed the door on the possibility of transferring power through the facade of an interim Saigon government and had called upon the people of the capital to help bring down the South Vietnamese Government.

The initial Soviet reaction to the downfall of the Saigon government came on the 30th in a TASS commentary by Sergey Bulantsev which portrayed Saigon's defeat as the "inevitable" fate of a "puppet regime." TASS also carried a brief account of Secretary Kissinger's 29 April press conference following the announcement that the airlift of Americans from Saigon had been concluded. The TASS report noted that, in response to a question on the influence of events in Southeast Asia on Soviet-U.S. detente, Kissinger had stated that despite ideological differences there was a practical basis for cooperation, particularly in preventing nuclear war. Peking's only response so far to the communist takeover has been two brief NCNA reports quoting LPA.

### COMMUNISTS SPURNED COMPROMISE BEFORE FINAL ASSAULT ON SAIGON

The PRG's 26 April government statement effectively blocked the frantic efforts by Saigon politicians to find an acceptable formula for the

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peaceful transfer of power through an interim Saigon government. The statement's appeal for the people of Saigon to join the PLAF in destroying the Saigon administration and army was promptly endorsed in a DRV Government statement the following day and echoed in propaganda which portrayed the PLAF closing in on the capital from every side and forecast that a total communist victory was at hand.

On 29 April Liberation Radio responded negatively and directly to the political maneuverings in Saigon, dismissing the new administration under General Duong Van Minh as another "puppet" regime and calling for "offensives and uprisings" to "end the war forever." This line was echoed in an article broadcast late on the 29th and published on the 30th in the North Vietnamese party paper NHAN DAN under the authoritative byline "Commentator." Commentator dismissed the Minh government as a "Thieu administration without Thieu"--the same epithet that had been used by the communists against the regime under Vice President Tran Van Huong which took over after Thieu's resignation on 21 April.

The PRG statement of the 26th represented a drastic change in line since the last previous major PRG statement of policy only two days earlier, in a government spokesman's statement on 24 April. Whereas the statement on the 24th had presented a virtual blueprint for the first steps of a political transition through a new administration in Saigon, the 26 April statement made no mention of the possibility of a new interim regime and it flatly demanded the abolition of the "Saigon administration" and the GVN "war machine and machinery for coercing and oppressing the people." It made no pretense at flexibility, even warning South Vietnamese "third force" figures--who presumably would have helped form a transition administration--that they must now join the "people" in the "struggle."

The 24 April statement by the PRG spokesman, in contrast to the government statement issued two days later, not only had advocated formation of a new government in Saigon but had offered concrete guidance which seemed designed to facilitate such a move. Apparently outlining the minimum concessions required of Saigon, the 24 April statement had specified that a new GVN administration must reject all U.S. aid and interference, require the withdrawal of U.S. ships from South Vietnamese waters, abrogate "antidemocratic laws," and release all political prisoners. It had also demanded the expulsion of U.S. "military" and "intelligence agency" personnel, leaving the implication that some other Americans could remain behind.

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The propaganda evidence does not make it clear whether the communists actually intended the 24 April statement to open the way for a political accommodation--albeit on their terms--or whether it was designed merely to further disrupt GVN ranks by raising false hopes that acquiescence to communist demands might stave off an assault on Saigon. An editorial in NHAN DAN on the 27th, commenting on the previous day's PRG statement, in recalling that the PRG at one time had proposed the formation of the new Saigon government, suggested that the harsher demands on the 26th were necessary because of U.S.-Saigon "disregard" for the earlier PRG demands. However, there was evidence much earlier that the communists were deliberately avoiding becoming tied to any political arrangement which would save Saigon from unconditional surrender. Since early April the Vietnamese communist media had refrained from repeating the PRG's standard promise that it would negotiate with a Saigon administration willing to implement the Paris peace agreement;\* the 24 April statement had similarly stopped short of committing the communists to deal with a new regime in Saigon which met its demands.

There is some media evidence suggesting possible disagreements among the Hanoi and PRG Vietnamese communists on how to manage the final chapter in the Vietnam war. While the unyielding, militant 26 April PRG statement prompted a strong endorsement from Hanoi the following day in a DRV Government statement, the markedly more flexible PRG spokesman's statement on the 24th--at a lower level of authority--had elicited only low-level North Vietnamese press and radio comment. The 27 April DRV Government statement was the first Hanoi statement at the government level endorsing PRG settlement terms since last October--a response which suggests the possibility that Hanoi, more than the PRG, was pressing for a military conclusion to the war rather than a temporary political accommodation with elements in Saigon.

The PRG's highest-level recent formulation of settlement terms prior to the 24 April PRG spokesman's statement was in a 21 March government statement that drew a DRV endorsement only at the level of DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman. Months earlier the PRG's 8 October 1974 government statement, which first demanded at an official level the removal of Thieu as a condition for settlement, had evoked a DRV Government statement on 11 October in support. It is noteworthy, however, that last October's DRV statement did not specifically endorse the 8 October PRG statement's offer to negotiate with a Saigon government replacing Thieu.

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\* The media's dropping of the PRG offer to negotiate with a new GVN administration is discussed in the TRENDS of 16 April 1975, pages 8-9.

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# PRC ENDORSED CALL FOR LIBERATION OF SOUTH VIETNAM, SCORED U.S.

When the communists were on the verge of their final takeover in South Vietnam, Peking gave its Vietnamese allies some of the strongest public support since the January 1973 Paris peace agreement. On 29 April the Chinese Foreign Ministry issued its first statement on Vietnam in more than two years, vigorously endorsing the call for liberation of South Vietnam voiced in PRG and DRV government statements on the 26th and 27th respectively. Previously, official Vietnamese statements in the post-agreement period had prompted only lower-level supporting comment in PEOPLE'S DAILY. Three days before the release of the foreign ministry statement, Peking also went to unusual lengths in scoring the U.S. role in Indochina. A 26 April PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article voiced the harshest authoritative Chinese criticism of U.S. actions in Vietnam in the past two years in seconding Vietnamese communist foreign ministry protests three days earlier against the use of "depression" bombs in the fighting at Xuan Loc.

The PRC Foreign Ministry statement voiced the backing of the Chinese Government and people for the Vietnamese communist demand for a total end to U.S. involvement and abolition of the Saigon administration, and it rebuked the "scheming tricks" by the United States and its "lackeys" as a futile effort to play for time by rigging up a "Thieu administration without Thieu." The statement portrayed the South Vietnamese people's struggle as "entirely just," lauded their recent "great victories," and depicted "patriotic army men and civilians" as advancing for the "total overthrow" of the Saigon government and the "complete liberation" of South Vietnam.

Showing some degree of restraint toward the United States, the 26 April PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article explicitly invoked the name of the Chinese people only in condemning the South Vietnamese Government for allegedly using "depression bombs"--CBU-55 bombs. While thus not specifically directing the Chinese people's wrath at the United States, Commentator did voice the harshest authoritative criticism of the United States on a Vietnam issue since before the signing of the Paris accord. Commentator said that Saigon's bombing "was directed by the U.S. Government," and it portrayed the use of such weapons of "mass murder" as consistent with past U.S. actions in Vietnam. Accusing the United States of having used "all up-to-date arms except atomic weapons in a wild massacre of the Vietnamese people," it recalled the alleged U.S. use of "poisonous gases and bacteriological weapons" against the Korean and Chinese people during the Korean war--the first resurrection in ten years in authoritative media of this sensitive PRC charge. The article juxtaposed its charges against the United States with a reference to Hitler's use of poisonous gases and chemical weapons.

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## CAMBODIA

### SPECIAL CONGRESS CONFIRMS SIHANOUK'S TITLE, NOTES POLICIES

A "Special National Congress" of Cambodia, held a week after the fall of Phnom Penh, confirmed Prince Sihanouk as chief of state and head of the Cambodian Front (NUFC) and Penn Nouth as government (RGNU) prime minister and chairman of the NUFC Central Committee. According to NCNA, both leaders were still in Peking, Sihanouk remaining with his mother, who died on 27 April after a lengthy illness. There was no indication where in Cambodia the 25-27 April congress was held. It was chaired by RGNU Deputy Prime Minister Khieu Samphan, who also read the 28 April press communique on the congress in a broadcast by Phnom Penh radio.

The congress communique went further than pronouncements on Front congresses this past February and in 1973 in making a point of personally praising Sihanouk and Penn Nouth. The current communique called Sihanouk a "great high-ranking patriotic personality" and Penn Nouth a "high-ranking patriotic personality," and it said that both had "actively contributed" to the Front's past struggle. By contrast, the single reference to Sihanouk and Penn Nouth in the 26 February 1975 communique on the second Front congress had noted their positions but not lauded their contribution.\* The 21 July 1973 statement on the first congress had referred to Sihanouk and Penn Nouth in their respective roles several times but had offered no special accolades.

"PEOPLE'S" ROLE, Evidently in an effort to demonstrate the  
NEUTRALITY POLICY existence of a broad base of popular  
Cambodian support, the communique put  
unusual stress on the important role now being played by the  
Cambodian "people" and their "mass organizations," rather than  
the NUFC and RGNU. Thus, unlike the pronouncements of past  
congresses, the current communique gave top billing to "people's  
organizations," ahead of the NUFC and RGNU, and stressed the "will  
of the people" as a source of legitimacy for current policies.

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\* The Front's second national congress is discussed in the  
TRENDS of 5 March 1975, pages 1-2.

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The communique also asserted that the new regime would strive for economic equality--"without rich or poor, without oppressing and oppressed classes"--an elaboration upon pledges by past congresses of ample support for all.

The congress communique reiterated Cambodian adherence to a policy of neutrality and voiced an injunction prohibiting "any country from establishing military bases in Cambodia"--a slight variation on the February 1975 congress prohibition against foreign military bases "for aggression." The current communique expressed opposition to "all forms" of foreign interference, and it elaborated on past expressions of willingness to accept unconditional aid by stressing that "subversion and aggression" under the cloak of "so-called humanitarianism" would not be tolerated. Unlike the pronouncements of past congresses, the present communique did not criticize the U.S. Administration by name, although it did attack "U.S. imperialism."

PEKING                      Following the jubilant Chinese celebration of the  
TREATMENT                  Front takeover in Phnom Penh,\* Peking media attention  
                                to Cambodia has centered on the death of Sihanouk's  
mother, Queen Sisowath Kossamak, and the return of a delegation  
of Chinese journalists from a visit to the Cambodian "liberated  
zone."

A 28 April message of condolences on the queen's death, signed by NPC chairman Chu Te and Premier Chou En-lai, expressed hope that Sihanouk would "translate sorrow into strength" for the work of Cambodian reconstruction. Also on 28 April Sihanouk received high-level Chinese mourners led by Vice Premiers Teng Hsiao-ping and Chen Hsi-lien, paying their respects at his Peking residence. The callers also included Teng Ying-chao, wife of Chou En-lai, who had visited the queen before her death, according to NCNA. Wreaths were presented in the in the name of Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai, Teng Hsiao-ping, Chiang Ching, and Teng Ying-chao, and flags were flown at half mast at Tienanmen and other official sites.

Peking gave high-level attention to the return of the nine-member Chinese journalist delegation from a 15-day visit to the Cambodian "liberated zone" during the last half of March. The delegation was

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\* Peking's treatment of the Front's victory is discussed in the TRENDS of 23 April 1975, pages 5-7.

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greeted at a reception on 23 April given by CCP Politburo members Yao Wen-yuan and Chi Teng-kuei. According to a 22 April NCNA dispatch, the delegation had "a very cordial and friendly conversation" with Khieu Samphan, and was honored at a Front banquet hosted by RGNU Interior Minister Hou Youn and Propaganda Minister Hu Nim during its travels in the Front-controlled areas.

Two NCNA correspondent reports filed by the delegation on 24 and 28 April strongly reflected themes heavily stressed in Peking's comment on Cambodia since the fall of Phnom Penh--the exemplary fashion in which the Front has employed people's war strategy and tactics on its road to victory, and the "close unity and increasingly strengthened and developing militant solidarity" between the Chinese and Cambodian peoples. The first report described frontline heroics by the Front's forces surrounding Phnom Penh on the "eve" of that city's fall and recounted the delegation's reception by the "cordial and frank" Son Sen, "commander" of the Phnom Penh front. The second described incidents manifesting Cambodian goodwill toward the delegation and reverence for Chairman Mao, and the delegation's reception by Khieu Samphan and the banquet held in its honor by Hou Youn and Hu Nim.

Front comment on the Chinese visit was restricted to a brief AKI communique of 22 April and a 25 April AKI report of a 24 April luncheon for the journalists in Peking hosted by an alternate NUFC politburo member.

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## SINO-KOREAN RELATIONS

## KIM IL-SONG PRC VISIT COMMUNIQUE STRESSES UNITY OF VIEWS

The PRC-DPRK communique on Kim Il-song's 18-26 April visit to China stressed the complete agreement of both sides on "all questions discussed" and said the visit was "crowned with complete success." The communique, carried by both NCNA and KCNA on 28 April, generally did not deviate from well-established North Korean and Chinese policy lines already reiterated in banquet speeches on 18 and 25 April.\* The communique took note of the "inspiring" developments in Indochina, but did not link events there with the situation in Korea. While the communique stated a "demand" that the United States immediately stop "aggression and interference" in Indochina, it did not specifically describe events there as a U.S. defeat.

The communique noted Kim's meeting with Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai, as well as the KWP delegation's various meetings with former members of the Chinese People's Volunteers who had fought alongside the "Korean people" during the war. Saying PRC-DPRK unity had been "cemented with blood" in protracted struggle against unnamed "common enemies," the communique promised China and Korea would unite "in the common struggle against imperialism and in the cause of socialist revolution."

In their section of the communique the Chinese referred to the DPRK as the "sole legal sovereign state of the Korean nation." The North Koreans have long made such a claim for themselves and have pushed this theme more frequently in the past several months, but Peking has not recently offered high-level support on this claim. A 22 May 1973 PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article commenting on North Korea's admission to the World Health Organization came to close to doing so, calling the DPRK "the true representative of the Korean people." Peking's strong formulation in the communique could be construed as an indirect answer to a U.S. proposal, first explicitly advanced in public last November by Assistant Secretary of State Habib, that contacts between the United States and North Korea depended on reciprocal steps by the USSR and PRC towards the South. Pyongyang had rejected this proposal last December.\*\*

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\* The 18 April banquet speeches are discussed in the TRENDS of 23 April 1975, pages 19-23.

\*\* Pyongyang's response to the U.S. proposal is discussed in the TRENDS of 15 January 1975, pages 29-30.

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The Chinese reiterated support for the "peaceful" reunification of Korea and singled out--as had Teng Hsiao-ping's 18 April speech--Kim Il-song's three principles and five-point proposal as the "correct way" for reunification. Like Teng's speech, the communique condemned the "Pak Chong-hui clique . . . supported and instigated by U.S. imperialism." Going beyond Teng's speech, the communique offered strong--but not unprecedented--support "for the South Korean people of all strata in their just struggle for the democratization of society and the independent and peaceful reunification of the fatherland." In a 23 October 1974 banquet speech in Peking for a DPRK trade delegation, Chang Shih-chung, alternate member of the CCP Central Committee, had said: "The Chinese workers and people . . . resolutely support the people in South Korea in their heroic struggle against the fascist rule of the Pak Chong-hui clique." Similarly, a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on 17 December 1973 had voiced "resolute support" for the "brave South Korean students and other people . . . in their just struggle."

In the communique the Chinese condemned "U.S. imperialism" for "attempting to perpetuate the division of Korea" and called for the dissolution of the UN Command and the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the South, but they did not attach any time frame to the demand. This was the only reference to the UN question in any Chinese or Korean comment during the visit.

The Korean section of the communique was brief, containing standard praise of Chinese domestic political developments and offering support for the "liberation" of Taiwan.

There was no reference in the communique to Chinese economic or military aid to North Korea, although economic and military advisers were present for discussions during the visit. When Kim and his party left Peking on 22 April for a two day visit to Nanking, the North Korean ministers of finance and of external economic affairs remained in Peking.

In apparent anticipation of the communique, banquet speeches by Kim and Chinese Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping on the 25th contained little of substance, being devoted almost exclusively to extolling Chinese-Korean unity and to advertising the identity of views between Peking and Pyongyang. Teng referred in his speech to the "complete identity" of views "on the international situation, including the situation on the Korean peninsula." Kim cited "present developments in Asia" as proving that "no force can check" the "downfall of the imperialists and their lackeys," but he did not directly link recent events to the Korean situation.

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## PRC FOREIGN RELATIONS

### CHINESE GOVERNMENT STATEMENT BACKS SIKKIM PEOPLE'S "STRUGGLE"

A 29 April PRC Government statement strongly rejects India's recent "illegal annexation" of Sikkim, pledges China's "firm support" to the "people of Sikkim" in their "just struggle" against Indian "expansionism," and links the Indian move to Soviet influence. The highly authoritative PRC Government statement, the first such by Peking on an international issue in more than a year, goes well beyond earlier official Peking criticism in sharpness of tone and pejoratives. It is Peking's most authoritative criticism of India since the Indo-Pakistani war crisis in late 1971.

The latest PRC statement contains elements not found in an 11 September 1974 PRC Foreign Ministry statement condemning Indian moves to control Sikkim, while omitting some of the earlier charges. The new statement declares that China "absolutely does not recognize India's illegal annexation," and it accuses New Delhi of indulging in the "fond dream of a great Indian empire" and subjecting its neighbors to 20 years of "control, interference, subversion and bullying." The current statement omits criticism of India's nuclear power development plans that was contained in the September 1974 foreign ministry statement, as well as the earlier statement's personal reference to Indira Gandhi.

The new statement accuses India of having "outdone old-line colonialism" by its actions in Sikkim, warns that New Delhi wants "to play the supreme lord in South Asia," and charges that India's "expansionist ambitions" in this regard have "swelled" in recent years. In this connection, it recalls India's 1971 "dismemberment" of Pakistan and its February 1975 decision incorporating Indian-occupied Kashmir into the Indian union. Playing up the role of the Soviet Union as the "behind-the-scenes boss" of Indian expansionism, the statement charges that Moscow is the "main threat" to South Asian independence and the "most dangerous enemy" of the people there.

In regard to the situation in Sikkim, the statement repeated the 1974 foreign ministry statement's condemnation by the "Chinese Government and people" of India's actions and pledged not to recognize Sikkim's new status. In addition, it firmly rebuked the current powerholders in Gangtok as "Sikkimese traitors" and offered repeated promises of "firm" Chinese backing for the "struggle" of the Chogyal and the Sikkim people. The 1974 statement had not referred to the Gangtok authorities, and it had offered only a single pledge of generalized Chinese support for Sikkimese resistance. Peking this time also

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added a warning that New Delhi's present moves "sound an alarm" for India's other neighbors, calling on these states to condemn both India and the USSR, and expressing confidence in their determination to strengthen unity and preserve their independence.

Only a few days earlier PRC Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien had heralded a firm Chinese line against Indian expansion in his remarks during his 20-25 April visit to Pakistan. In a speech at the strategic city of Lahore along the Indian border on 23 April, for instance, Li responded to his Pakistani host's praise of Chinese support during Pakistan's wars against India in 1965 and 1971 with pointed criticism of India's designs in Sikkim and elsewhere in South Asia. Li made a broad pledge of Chinese support for "the South Asian peoples" against New Delhi and Moscow and reiterated China's commitment to Pakistan's defense.

#### PHILIPPINE CP RATIONALIZES PEKING-MANILA CONTACTS

An October 1974 statement by the Philippine Communist Party (PCP) Central Committee seeking to rationalize Peking's dealing with the incumbent Philippine administration of President Marcos as being consistent with continued Peking support for the Philippine revolution was recently publicized by a communist-controlled clandestine radio. The PCP statement of 15 October, written in response to the late September visit to China by Philippines first lady Imelda Marcos and in anticipation of diplomatic relations being established between Peking and Manila, was serially broadcast for the first known time on 17, 19 and 22 April by the China-based Voice of the Malayan Revolution (VOMR) radio.\* The statement stresses benefits expected for the national liberation movement from better Peking-Manila relations, claims that increased trade between the two countries will weaken "traditional U.S. control and influence" over the Philippines, and predicts that the development of educational and cultural exchanges will allow Filipinos to gain "a true picture" of the Chinese revolution, thereby fueling their own struggle.

The statement acknowledged that the PRC-Philippine rapprochement has caused uneasiness in the revolutionary ranks, but called "totally unfounded" fears that Peking might withdraw its support for the Philippines struggle in its eagerness to establish diplomatic relations with Manila. However, it warned that "revolution cannot be imported"

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\* VOMR, which in the past has often carried propaganda directed toward Peking-supported insurgencies outside of Malaysia, has not broadcast PCP statements or material dealing with the Philippines struggle since December 1973.

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with the establishment of PRC ties and that such ties "cannot take the place of the Philippine revolution," which must be carried out "according to Philippine conditions."

The statement dismissed as "revisionist renegades" those who accused the PCP of self-contradiction for advocating relations with Peking but not with Moscow.

BACKGROUND        The Philippine CP statement is the latest in a series of similar statements by Chinese-supported communist parties in Southeast Asia concerning normalization of relations between Peking and the governments which these movements oppose. In no case has the resumption of diplomatic relations ended insurgent party opposition. For example, following Ne Win's trip to Peking normalizing relations in August 1971, the Burmese Communist Party in a statement broadcast by the PRC-based Voice of the People of Burma denounced Ne Win's government for thinking that improved ties with Peking would solve pressing economic and political difficulties. Similarly, in May 1974, following the establishment of PRC-Malaysian relations, the VOMR radio hailed the establishment of relations as marking the "bankruptcy" of the Razak government's hostility toward China while accusing Razak of resorting to "doubledealing tactics" to solve political and economic crises. Recent broadcasts by the Voice of the People of Thailand (VOPT), also a PRC-based clandestine radio, have characterized steps by Bangkok toward establishment of relations with Peking as being taken only in response to persistent popular pressure.\*

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\* The Burmese CP reaction is discussed in the TRENDS of 18 August 1971, pages 25-26. The broadcasts of VOMR on PRC-Malaysian relations are discussed in the TRENDS of 5 June 1974, pages 20-21 and 19 June 1974, page 32. For VOPT reaction to steps toward PRC-Thai relations, see the TRENDS of 31 December 1974, page 14.

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## PRC - TAIWAN

## PEKING PRESSES TAIPEI ON ACCEPTING AMNESTIED KMT OFFICERS

Peking has recently increased propaganda pressure on the Taipei government to admit ten Kuomintang "war criminals" recently amnestied by the PRC who are currently waiting in Hong Kong for permission to travel to Taiwan. Several signed articles recently broadcast over Peking's radio services beamed to Taiwan have depicted Taipei's footdragging on accepting the former KMT officials as evidence of Nationalist disloyalty to those who formerly supported the KMT, have warned current KMT functionaries on Taiwan of similar treatment by Taipei in the future, and have underlined Peking's greater commitment to establish a "revolutionary united front" despite Taipei's intransigence. The ten KMT officials awaiting transit permission were among the almost 300 former "war criminals" pardoned by Peking in March;\* NCNA reported they left Peking for Taiwan via Hong Kong on 13 April.

The articles beamed to Taiwan, generally signed by former prominent Nationalist officials now residing on the mainland, have characterized Taipei's stand as "heartless" and "perverted," stating that it flies in the face of the Nationalists' espousal of Confucian virtues of loyalty, benevolence and righteousness. Citing alleged Taipei charges that the ten officials were "spies" and "tool of the Chinese communist united front," the articles stress that such accusations against officials who risked their lives and have undergone long confinement because of their loyalty to the Kuomintang can only make officials now serving the KMT on Taiwan "feel a chill run down their spines."

The articles are replete with claims of the "tremendous impact" the PRC amnesty has had among people and officials in Taiwan and have underscored Peking's resolve to employ a new, united front strategy. Thus, a 20 April article referring to the amnesty went to unusual lengths to praise the "revolutionary united front" as a "magic weapon" used by the Chinese people to defeat adversaries, noting that it had been successfully employed under Sun Yat-sen, during the war against Japan, and in the Chinese civil war, and that it would now successfully serve to isolate "the handful of diehards of the Chiang gang" on Taiwan. Articles have encouraged Taipei officials to join the current united front. One article by a former KMT general warned against relying on "foreign powers" for support, noting that "the case of Phnom Penh and Saigon should be a vivid lesson for you."

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\* Peking's amnesty decision is discussed in the TRENDS of 19 March 1975, pages 27-28.

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## MIDDLE EAST

## GROMYKO OFFERS ISRAEL GUARANTEES IN SPEECH TO SYRIAN GUESTS

The strongest Soviet statement to date on Israel's right to exist appeared on 23 April in a Gromyko dinner speech addressed to Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam, Moscow's third important Arab visitor in two weeks. Gromyko combined specific mention of Israel--in the formula on the right of all Mideast states to exist--with the suggestion of "strictest guarantees," and additionally offered Soviet participation in such guarantees. While no individual elements in his statement were new in themselves, this appears to be the first time they have been combined by a Soviet leader in a single statement.\*

Gromyko sharply criticized "partial" agreements, and the Syrian-Soviet communique on Khaddam's 23-25 April visit again contained the formulation--first appearing in the Soviet-Egyptian communique last week--linking partial accords to the Geneva framework.

Khaddam was received by Brezhnev on the 25th, an honor Egyptian Foreign Minister Fahmi had received during his visit the previous week. In a bland report on the meeting, curiously not issued until after the final communique, TASS on the 26th noted that the talks had been held in a "warm and friendly atmosphere" and that both parties expressed a desire to strengthen cooperation "in all fields." Khaddam was cited as expressing Syria's gratitude for Soviet assistance in developing its national economy and in strengthening its "defense potential."

**RIGHT TO EXIST** Gromyko's dinner speech remarks on guarantees of Israel's right to exist were not new in themselves, but were striking in their firmness and especially because he was addressing Syrian guests. Going beyond what he had said in his speech during Egyptian Foreign Minister Fahmi's visit the previous week, Gromyko stated that if Israel wanted secure frontiers and peaceful conditions for the existence of

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\* Cairo's **AKHBAR AL-YAWM** observed on 26 April that Moscow had made "ambiguous" statements on guarantees before, and there had been contacts between the Soviet Union and Israel before, but that this was "the first time the Soviet Union has announced this guarantee with such clarity."

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the state, it had only to withdraw from Arab territories. He went on to offer--under "an appropriate agreement"--Soviet participation in the "strictest" guarantees for the existence and development of all states in the region.

Gromyko's remarks came against a background of reports in Israeli--but not Soviet--media that Soviet emissaries had held top-level talks in Israel around the end of March or early April. Even before the 22 March suspension of the Kinninger mission and the reported Soviet-Israeli discussions, leading Soviet Mideast commentator Primakov had specifically included Israel in the "existence" formula. Participating in a 23 February Moscow radio observers' roundtable, Primakov had reiterated what he called the Soviet "three-in-one formula"--Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territories, insuring the national rights of the Palestinians, and insuring the security of existence of all states of the area, "including, naturally, Israel too."

A month later, TASS Director General Zamyatin, on Moscow radio's International Situation program on 29 March, had similarly cited the three-part formula calling for "reliable international guarantees of the right of every state of that region, including Israel, to independent existence and development." (In October 1969, when he was Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman, Zamyatin had noted that Security Council Resolution 242 proceeded from the premise that all nations in the area were entitled to independent existence and development, and "this equally applies to Israel.")

BACKGROUND: Gromyko and Kosygin are the two Soviet leaders who have gone on record in the past in specifying that the right to exist applied to Israel. The common formulation in most Soviet comment has been that the USSR supports the security and existence of "all" states in the Middle East. Variations on this formula have been voiced by Brezhnev and other leaders on various occasions, including functions honoring Arab visitors. For example, Brezhnev, at a dinner for Syria's President al-Assad in April 1974, said the Soviet Union supported "insuring the security and sovereignty of all the states of the area."

Kosygin set forth the Soviet view shortly after the June 1967 war, when he recalled in his speech that month at the UN General Assembly special session that the Soviet Union had voted in 1947 for the UN decision to create two independent states in Palestine, and declared that the USSR "is not against Israel--it is against the aggressive policy pursued by the ruling circles of that state."

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He had gone on to affirm that "every people enjoys the right to establish an independent national state of its own," calling this one of the "fundamental principles" of Soviet policy.

Subsequently, in a LIFE magazine interview in February 1968 and in a speech in Minsk the same month, Konygin had declared that the USSR did not favor elimination of Israel, but was in favor of its existence as a state. Konygin has also responded to journalists' questions on the subject during visits to Western countries. A TASS report carried in IZVESTIYA on 24 October 1971 noted that Konygin, at a press conference in Ottawa, declared that captured Arab territories must be returned and "guarantees must be given to Israel that it will exist and that no one will violate its frontiers." He added that Israel must, "as the aggressor," return the captured territories completely. The Soviet weekly NEW TIMES on 13 April 1973 was the only known Soviet source for a report that Konygin at a Stockholm press conference on 5 April had responded to a question about Soviet diplomatic relations with Israel by remarking that the USSR was one of the countries which voted for the creation of the state of Israel. "Even now," he added, "we believe that the state of Israel has a right to exist, but this does not mean that we can come to terms with its aggression . . . ."

Gromyko has specifically mentioned Israel's right to exist in a variety of public statements, dating at least from his report to the USSR Supreme Soviet in June 1968, when he mentioned the need to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of every state of this area, "whether an Arab state or Israel." In his September 1969 UN General Assembly address he pointed out that Security Council Resolution 242 provided for recognition of the right to existence of all Middle East states, including Israel. And again, in his UNGA address last September, he declared that the Soviet Union "supports the idea that Israel should exist and develop as an independent sovereign state. We have said so many times and we reaffirm it once again." He went on in that speech to say that progress in a Mideast settlement would create preconditions for the Soviet Union to develop relations with all Middle East states, including Israel.

Gromyko had spelled out the Soviet position for the Arab and other delegates in his speech at the opening session of the Geneva peace conference on 21 December 1973:

It is known that the contention that Israel is denied the right to exist was advanced as almost the main argument in favor of occupation of lands of others. This argument does

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not hold water. This right of Israel was recognized by the very fact of the formation of that state on the decision of the United Nations. It was confirmed by the fact that many states, including the Soviet Union, established diplomatic relations with Israel in the past. Israel's Arab neighbors expressed their readiness to come to an agreement on settlement on the basis of the well-known resolutions of the Security Council which clearly express the principle that all the states involved in the conflict have the right to exist.

**GUARANTEES**      As in the case of the "right to exist" formula, infrequent Soviet references to "international guarantees" in the Middle East have, with few exceptions, been cast in terms of guaranteeing the borders, security, and/or existence of "all" states in the area, without specifying Israel. Soviet leaders have added from time to time--but not consistently--an expression of Moscow's readiness to contribute toward insuring these goals. Gromyko's formulation on guarantees would appear to be unique in that it combines a specific mention of Israel with an offer of Soviet participation. However, he inserted some cautious qualifiers when he said that Israel may get, "if it wishes so," the strictest guarantees with the participation--"under an appropriate agreement"--of the Soviet Union.\* And he carefully added that these guarantees would insure peaceful conditions for the existence and development of "all" states in the Middle East.

Emphasizing his point, Gromyko, in a subsequent passage repeating the right-to-exist formula, called for agreement to insure "and guarantee" the rights of all states of the Middle East, "including

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\* Without then naming Israel, Gromyko had made similar remarks in his speech at the 21 December 1973 Geneva peace conference. Remarking that commitments within international law taken up by the sides themselves would be the best guarantee of their mutual security, he added that "if it becomes necessary to add weight to the agreements, the Soviet Union, with account of the wishes of the sides concerned, and together with other powers, is prepared to take appropriate commitments." The Security Council too, he noted, "can lend its weight in the matter."

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the state of Israel," to independent existence and development. He had specified Israel in a similar passage in his speech at the dinner for Fahmi without, however, mentioning guarantees.\*

Earlier, Gromyko had implied guarantees for Israel--without explicitly offering a Soviet contribution--in his 28 September 1971 speech at the UN General Assembly. Remarking that "Israel has displayed uneasiness about its security," he had added that it was clear that within the framework of a Mideast political settlement "the appropriate guarantees, including the Security Council's guarantees, can be given." He called these "the strongest guarantees conceivable in the modern world."

Other than Gromyko's remarks, the only known authoritative Soviet statement calling for guarantees to Israel was made by Kosygin in his 20 October 1971 press conference in Ottawa. According to a TASS report in the 24 October 1971 IZVESTIYA, Kosygin declared that the Soviet Union approached the question of a peaceful settlement of the Mideast problem in accordance with Security Council Resolution 242. The captured Arab territories must be liberated, Kosygin said, and "guarantees must be given to Israel that it will exist and that no one will violate its frontiers."

BACKGROUND: The notion of guarantees for the security of Arab and Israeli frontiers apparently was first advanced by Moscow in the Soviet proposals for an overall Mideast settlement outlined in major PRAVDA articles in January 1969 and January 1970 and discussed periodically by Soviet commentators. The Soviet proposals suggested the possibility of guarantees by the Security Council or by the Council's permanent members.

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\* Syrian President al-Asad, in a French TV interview broadcast by Damascus radio on 21 March, did not rule out international guarantees of a just settlement "when we reach it." For his part, Egyptian President as-Sadat has said that Egypt needs guarantees more than Israel; in his TIME magazine interview, as reported by the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY on 6 April, he added that "for that reason I am ready to accept these guarantees from any quarter that can offer them, whether the two superpowers, the big four, the big five--including China--or the UN Security Council."

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Brezhnev, in his 30 March 1971 report to the CPSU 24th Congress, made the first authoritative affirmation of Soviet readiness to participate with other Council permanent members in "creating international guarantees for a political settlement" in the Middle East. The appearance of such a pledge at that time might have been related to Egypt's reference to guarantees in documents earlier that year--a 15 January memorandum to the UN Secretary General's Mideast representative Gunnar Jarring, and a 15 February reply to Jarring's 8 February memorandum. Drawing on the language of Security Council Resolution 242, Cairo had called for "guaranteeing peace and the territorial inviolability and political independence of every state in the area"--a point cited in Soviet comment praising Egypt's "initiative."

Brezhnev had repeated his pledge in speeches in October 1973. Two days after the war began, he said at an 8 October luncheon for the visiting Japanese prime minister that the USSR supported guaranteed security for all countries and peoples of an area so close to Soviet frontiers. He added that "we are prepared as before to make our contribution" toward insuring such a peace. With greater emphasis, he said in his 26 October speech to the World Peace Congress in Moscow that "we are firmly in favor of all, I repeat all, states and peoples of the Middle East being insured peace, security and the inviolability of frontiers." And he added that "the Soviet Union is prepared to take part in the relevant guarantees." Last fall Brezhnev supported the idea of guarantees without referring to Soviet readiness to participate: in his 26 November speech in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, he called for "reliable and authoritative guarantees of the security and independence of all the countries now drawn into the sphere of the conflict."

GENEVA  
CONFERENCE

During Khaddam's visit Moscow continued to urge adequate prior preparations for the Geneva conference. Gromyko in his dinner speech on the 23d stressed, as he had on the 19th, during Egyptian Foreign Minister Fahmi's visit to Moscow, that resumption of the talks "in the nearest future" could be combined with "serious preparations." The joint communique on Khaddam's visit, as that on Fahmi's, reiterated the same position. At the same time Soviet media have warned against attempts to stretch out preparations and delay resumption of the Geneva talks indefinitely, typically accusing Israel of this tactic.

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Moscow's continuing professions of interest in arranging resumption of the Geneva conference "at the earliest date" possible may stem from renewed concern that bilateral Arab-Israeli accord remain possible, despite the 22 March breakdown of Secretary Kissinger's Mideast mission. Gromyko, at the dinner for Khaddam, sharply denounced as a "vicious method" the arrangement of "partial deals, separate and apart from the solution of basic settlement problems" and repeated past Soviet criticisms of partial measures for allegedly creating "additional difficulties" rather than contributing to a final settlement. The Soviet-Syrian communique on 26 April also underlined Moscow's concern over "partial" agreements by repeating the formulation, expressed for the first time in the Soviet-Egyptian communique on Fahmy's visit, that ties any new Arab-Israeli bilateral agreements to the Geneva conference framework.

Moscow has also continued to stress that the Geneva talks should deal practically with major substantive problems. Gromyko in his speech on the 23d, for example, asserted that "concrete questions" of a settlement could be discussed "from the first day." According to TASS, he stated that the Geneva talks should consider "serious problems," adding

We would not like this conference--which is to be attended on an equal footing with other sides concerned by representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organization--to be reduced just to some fanfaronade, even if statements of a political character are made at it, but without any practical follow-up.

MILITARY ISSUES      As in previous Soviet-Syrian communiqués on President al-Asad's 11-16 April 1974 visit to Moscow and Gromyko's 1-3 February 1975 visit to Damascus, the joint communique on Khaddam's visit stressed the importance of strengthening Syria's military capabilities and reaffirmed Syria's

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\* In reporting Gromyko's speech, TASS' English service on the 23d and Moscow radio's Arabic service on the 24th used the word "vicious"; PRAVDA on the 24th, however, used "defective."

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"right to use all means" to liberate its occupied territory.\* Although a repetition of Moscow's past public positions, the communique's reference to Syria's military forces and its implication of continued Soviet assistance stand in marked contrast to the absence of such references in the Soviet-Egyptian communique last week on Fahmi's visit.

Further underscoring Moscow's interest in Syrian military matters, the chief of the Soviet General Staff, Army General V. Kulikov, visited Syria from 22-25 April, virtually simultaneously with Khaddam's visit to Moscow.\*\* A communique on Kulikov's visit, carried by TASS on the 26th, stated that he met with President al-Asad and the Syrian defense minister and that talks were held on "issues pertaining to military cooperation." In language similar to the communique on Khaddam's visit, it also reaffirmed Moscow's policy of "all-round aid and support" to the Arabs and expressed the sides' intention to expand contacts between their armed forces.

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\* The original version of this phrase, as it first appeared in the communique on Egyptian President as-Sadat's April 1972 visit to Moscow, acknowledged the Arabs' right to use "other means" to regain their occupied territories. See the FBIS TRENDS of 3 May 1972, pages 31-34. Subsequently, Moscow commentators varied this phrase, using "different means" and "all means," among others. The phrase has not appeared frequently in recent years.

\*\* Kulikov's last trip to the Middle East was a 27 November 1974 visit to Iraq. Prior to that, he had visited Turkey in April 1972.

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## WESTERN ECONOMIC CRISIS

## MOSCOW STRESSES CAPITALIST WORLD TROUBLES, AVOIDS PREDICTIONS

A stream of Soviet comment and reportage, mostly low-level, on Western economic troubles over the past year has conveyed a picture of growing crisis in the capitalist world, accompanied by heightened tensions among Western states and between governments and peoples. This portrayal is clearly inconsistent with another picture which Moscow paints--that of a blossoming of trade and economic cooperation between the Soviet Union and Western states based on the continued development of detente. The latter is still the dominant image in the Soviet propaganda montage, but whether it remains so is clearly a question that may provide an index of Soviet leadership attitudes in the run-up to the CPSU's 25th party congress.

WESTERN ECONOMIC  
CRISIS

The latest high-level assessment of Western economic troubles was provided by Suslov in his Lenin anniversary address on 22 April.

He drew the Western economic crisis in very dark colors, comparing it with the depression of the 1930's and contrasting it with the prosperity allegedly being enjoyed by the socialist countries. Nevertheless, while identifying the Western crisis as a further stage in the general crisis of world capitalism, he refrained from predicting a collapse of the capitalist system or any definite change from existing conditions. Indeed, Suslov's praise of Brezhnev's foreign policy line, and his commitment to the "strengthening and deepening of detente" seemed to imply a belief that the West is far from being in its final agony.

## TRADE PROSPECTS

A complementary picture of the Western economic situation was provided by A. Mileykovskiy in an article in PRAVDA on 26 April. Also comparing the present crisis with the depression of the 1930's, Mileykovskiy argued that the situation was even worse now, because all capitalist countries were suffering the same symptoms at the same time. But he nevertheless stressed an optimistic note by suggesting that there were ways to mitigate the crisis and restore some measure of stability to the Western economies. His ideas were first, curbing the arms race, and secondly, trade with the socialist countries, whose economies were stable and vigorous. Seemingly aware that his prescriptions could be criticized for a lack of ideological purity, he pointed out that the restoration of economic health in the West could go hand in hand with political and social changes in the capitalist countries.

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Mileykovskiy's article is consistent with a main line of Soviet comment in recent months that has apparently been aimed at projecting a "reasonable" attitude on the trade issue. Economist Shershnev, deputy director of the USA Institute, in a talk broadcast to North America on 15 April, for example, directly contested the notion that the Soviet Union took pleasure from the troubles of the West. Quite to the contrary, he asserted, the Soviet Union wants to develop trade, providing the United States does not think that by trading with the Soviet Union it is doing the latter a favor.

Still earlier, Soviet Foreign Trade Minister N. Patolichev made an even stronger pitch for trade with the United States in a PRAVDA article on 9 April. While acknowledging that the socialist states could not directly aim at "curing" Western economic ills, he nevertheless pointed out that this would be the undoubted effect of increased East-West trade, one which the socialist states could justify by the fact that it would "ease the burdens" on the working people.

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## P O R T U G A L

## USSR CALLS ELECTIONS SUCCESSFUL, RATIONALIZES POOR PCP RESULTS

Moscow's immediate reaction to Portugal's 25 April constituent assembly elections has been in effect to call them a success because they took place in "calm and good order" despite alleged efforts by Western media to conjure up a scene of internal violence and anarchy. Soviet media have depicted the elections, held on the first anniversary of the 1974 coup, as an endorsement by the Portuguese people of the developments over the past year under the leadership of the Armed Forces Movement, in alliance with the "progressive" political forces.

But Moscow has found it difficult to explain objectively the poor showing of the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP).<sup>\*</sup> While candidly acknowledging the election figures, it has sought to rationalize the low vote for the PCP, attributing this to the influence of alleged internal and external "reactionary" pressures on the supposedly still politically naive Portuguese electorate. This same argument had been a dominant theme in both the PCP election campaign and in Moscow preelection comment. Brushing aside the real PCP standing among the Portuguese people, Soviet commentators have generally stressed that the results were a victory for the unspecified government "coalition" parties, thus implicitly including the PCP among the victors.

Moscow has echoed statements of confidence by PCP leader Cunhal playing down the significance of the election results and their future implications. Several commentaries--including TASS' first general assessment of the elections in a dispatch from Lisbon on the 27th, and a 30 April IZVESTIYA article--cited Cunhal's post-election assertion that it would be wrong to assume that the election results were "the only indicator of the power and influence of political parties." The voting, Cunhal said, "did not fully reflect the strength of the communist party, its influence, its ability to mobilize the masses, and its role in the Portuguese revolution."

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<sup>\*</sup> The "final" results for the five major parties, as announced by Lisbon radio on 28 April, were as follows: Portuguese Socialist Party (PS), 38 percent; left of center Popular Democratic Party (PPD) 26 percent; Portuguese Communist Party (PCP), 13 percent; right of center Social Democratic Center Party (CDS), 8 percent; and the PCP-allied Portuguese Democratic Movement (MDP-CDE), 4 percent.

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Similarly, Moscow has pointed out that the election results would not affect the composition of the present provisional government nor its policies, implying that the PCP and the Portuguese Democratic Movement would not have to surrender some representation in the cabinet to the Socialists and the Popular Democrats to reflect the election proportions. PRAVDA's Lisbon correspondent V. Yermakov said on the 29th, for example, that although the results will be analyzed for a long time, "it is quite clear" that the cabinet will be "basically the same as before." In contrast to this relatively optimistic view of the PCP's future role in Portuguese political life, IZVESTIYA's political observer V. Matveyev, participating in the 27 April Moscow radio weekly roundtable, offered a convoluted explanation of--if not an excuse for--the PCP's poor election results.

## CALL FOR UNITED LEFT

Although Soviet comment has generally sought to link the PCP as closely as possible to the Armed Forces Movement and its policies, Moscow at the same time has been implicitly advising the PCP to cooperate with other major leftist parties. Moscow thus seems again to be drawing attention to the necessity for maintaining cooperative relationships among the left; the PRAVDA editorial article of 21 February on Portugal had explicitly admonished the PCP on this point.\* Such suggestions now, in view of the disappointing election results, might reflect Soviet uncertainty over the future of the PCP's relationship with and influence over the Movement and individual Movement leaders.

While citing Cunhal's assertion that PCP cooperation with the Movement would continue as before, Soviet comment has emphasized a parallel theme, in effect calling for cooperation among the PCP, the Socialists, and even the Popular Democrats, to continue the Portuguese revolution in alliance with the Movement. The TASS dispatch of the 27th and a radio commentary on the 28th by one of Moscow's main communist and European affairs commentators, Yuriy Shalygin, cited Cunhal as saying that the PCP "always believed it desirable" for the Socialist Party to join together with the PCP and "other democratic forces in building a new Portugal." Both TASS and Shalygin went on to report Socialist leader Soares as saying in effect that the Socialists wanted to cooperate with the PCP and the Popular Democrats. Moscow's inclusion of Soares' reference to the Popular Democrats is notable in that Cunhal, following the abortive 11 March coup, had labeled this party as "fascist" and demanded that it be ousted from the government.

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\* See the TRENDS of 26 February 1975, pages 8-10, for a discussion of the PRAVDA editorial article.

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## U S S R

## LEADERSHIP RANKINGS UNCHANGED IN SUPREME SOVIET NOMINATIONS

No change was evident in the relative rankings of CPSU Politburo members as deduced from the careful gradations of honorifica and the number of nominations reported on 25 April, the form-setting first day of nominations for candidates in republic Supreme Soviet elections. As before, Brezhnev ranked well above his colleagues both in the verbal honors accorded him and in the number of nominations he received. His senior colleagues, Podgornyy and Kosygin, received a much smaller share of the nominations--much smaller also than the number they received in the last republic campaign in 1971. They appear to have enjoyed some upgrading in verbal honors, however, clearly getting more credit this time than in last year's USSR Supreme Soviet campaign for personal contributions in the field of foreign affairs.

The number of nominations on the first day, which sets the pattern for the campaign, showed Brezhnev further ahead of Podgornyy and Kosygin than in the previous republic-level elections (1971). However, the gap was not as wide as during the USSR elections of 1974 and 1970.

## First-Day Nominations as Reported in PRAVDA

	25 Apr 1975 (republic)	28 Apr 1971 (republic)	19 Apr 1974 (USSR)	25 Apr 1970 (USSR)
Brezhnev	17	17	23	19
Podgornyy	10	15	11	7
Kosygin	10	15	11	7
Suslov	3	3	4	4
Kirilenko	3	2	4	4
Mazurov	1	2	2	1
Pelshe	1	2	2	2
Polyanskiy	1	2	2	2
Grishin	1	1	2	-
Kulakov	1	1	3	-
Kunayev	1	1	1	-
Shcherbitskiy	1	1	2	-
Andropov	1	-	2	-
Grechko	1	-	2	-
Gromyko	1	-	2	-

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Brezhnev's higher status vis-a-vis Podgornyy and Kosygin was also demonstrated by the reporting of nominations from the individual republics--a breakdown provided by PRAVDA's TASS account of the first day's nominations. In 1971 all three top leaders were reportedly nominated in each republic; in 1975, Brezhnev was again nominated in all 15 republics, but only five republics (RSFSR, Ukraine, Belorussia, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan) nominated Podgornyy and Kosygin as well as Brezhnev. In the 1974 USSR campaign Podgornyy and Kosygin had fared even worse, with only the RSFSR, Ukraine and Kirgizia reporting nominations for both of them on the first day.

**HYPERIFICS** The allotments of praise and credits in the 25 April PRAVDA TASS account of the first day's nominations were essentially the same as last year for Brezhnev, but slightly more favorable for Podgornyy and Kosygin. Brezhnev was hailed as the "outstanding figure of the Communist Party, Soviet state and international communist and workers movement," a "true Leninist," "tireless fighter for peace." He was also described as head of the Politburo and he was lauded for work in developing the economy, raising the living standard and welfare of the people, making an "outstanding contribution" to detente and working hard to strengthen peace. No new forms of glorification appeared, however, as Brezhnev had received the same titles on the first day of the 1974 campaign for the USSR Supreme Soviet--plus the title of "wise leader" (rukovoditel) of the party--and had been praised for his "huge labor" for peace. At the start of the 1971 campaign for the republic Supreme Soviets he had been similarly praised as the "outstanding figure" of the world communist movement, a "true Leninist," "tireless fighter" and "talented leader" of the party.

Podgornyy was labeled a "prominent figure of the Communist Party, Soviet state and international communist movement," who in his "high post" of Supreme Soviet Presidium chairman made a "big contribution to strengthening peace" and whose "active work in the international arena had won deep recognition" throughout the world. While Podgornyy had been similarly described as a "prominent figure" in 1974, he was then given credit only for a "contribution to strengthening peace" and improving the work of the soviets.

Kosygin this year was called a "prominent figure of the Communist Party and Soviet state," who in his "responsible post" of premier directs his "rich experience and knowledge" to developing the economy, raising the living standard of the people and strengthening the

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international position of the Soviet Union. In 1974 Konygin also received the "prominent figure" description, but was credited only with a "big contribution" to improving planning and the administration of industry.

The only other leaders to receive titles or praise this year were Suslov ("prominent figure of the Communist Party and Soviet state" and "steadfast Leninist") and Kirilenko ("true Leninist, prominent figure of the Communist Party and Soviet state").

In 1974 the honors accorded Podgornyy and Konygin were somewhat diluted when a number of other Politburo members received laudatory epithets and credit. Suslov, like Podgornyy, was ranked then as a "prominent" figure of world communism, while Kirilenko, Kulakov, Polyanskiy, Shcherbitskiy and Andropov were ranked with Konygin as "prominent" domestic figures. Suslov was given credit for a "big contribution" to rallying world communism, and Gromyko for a "big contribution" to strengthening peace. Grechko was praised for strengthening defense, Grishin for mobilizing the workers to fulfill plans, Kulakov and Polyanskiy for improving agriculture, and Shelepin for improving trade union work.

In 1971 Podgornyy and Konygin were given the same distinction they have been given this year, being the only Politburo members except Brezhnev to receive honorifica ("prominent political and state figure"). They did not, however, receive the special credit for foreign or domestic achievements that has been given them this year.

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## CHINA

## LIAONING DISCUSSES "RED AND EXPERT" BALANCE IN EDUCATION

Liaoning province's Shenyang radio on 21 April broadcast two big-character posters, presenting opposing viewpoints, written by students at a local technical college, which appear aimed at sparking a new round of discussion reaffirming the continued need to stress politics and ideology in the schools. Liaoning province has served as an educational pacesetter in the past, and the tone of the broadcast is reminiscent of a July 1973 Shenyang report which triggered a successful national campaign to prevent a return to the old form of college entrance examinations based on rote memorization of middle school texts. Both posters were originally written in February; the timing of the current Liaoning broadcast suggests a new campaign may be in the offing to avoid excessive reliance on professionalism in the annual spring college enrollment drive which is about to commence. A separate LIAONING DAILY editor's note broadcast along with the posters informed local cadres that the posters "merit our attention" and called upon them to organize discussions "to provide Marxist answers to the issues raised by these big-character posters."

The first poster, "We Will Never Be Just Ordinary Workers--Some of Our Views," dated 25 February 1975, criticized the sacrosanct principle that college students should become "ordinary" workers after graduation. Arguing in favor of the taboo concept of intellectual elitism in higher education, the poster urged that college graduates could never be just "ordinary" workers after completing their studies because they acquire advanced skills enabling them to make professional contributions "definitely greater than those of ordinary workers." Raising the question of classroom vs. practical training, the poster focused on the value of classroom study, discrediting the idea that "it does not matter if we now study only a little, for we can continue our study in practice." The poster claimed that even if students now in college did "seize this opportunity, make full use of these conditions, and make rational arrangements for our study, we still cannot study all that will be useful to us in the future." Butressing this position, the poster argued that students must "do a great deal of technical work after their graduation" and that they "must have the confidence, ability and skills to accomplish such a task."

The first poster cites Lenin, Stalin, Mao and Chou as authorities in outlining its position, but even such devices seem unlikely to win much support for the view that graduates are superior to

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ordinary workers. Liaoning's broadcast treatment at this time seems designed to use the first poster as a negative example contrasting with the views of the second poster, presented as a reply to the first on the following day. The second poster attacked the view that graduates should not become ordinary workers, specifically asserting that the first poster "reflects an erroneous and harmful line of thinking" and that graduates "should be nothing else but ordinary workers, the more ordinary the better." Claiming that it is incorrect to say that "graduates fresh from school can definitely contribute more than ordinary workers," the second poster developed the thesis that "everyone can contribute more to the revolution regardless of his profession or position."

Both posters raise the rarely discussed issue that attention to politics may cause a serious shortage in personnel needed for advanced technical research in the future. The first poster expressed concern over whether sufficient personnel were being trained and even raised the question of whether technical experts would have to be imported from abroad. The second poster criticized the authors of the first for "fearing that being an ordinary worker tends to lower one's desire to pursue professional studies."

Problems over current shortages of technical personnel were previously indicated to exist in Anhwei, where the provincial radio on 21 February broadcast an unusually frank investigation report on a geological department in a local university. Indicating that the university suffered from a shortage of qualified teachers, the broadcast revealed that "because the professional courses of the geological department have expanded and the number of students increased, the current number of available teachers does not meet the need." Although the propriety of providing incentives to encourage students to undertake professional studies--a policy criticized in the second poster--was not specifically discussed in the Anhwei broadcast, it did laud the provincial bureau of geology for taking "various measures" to "beef up the teaching staff of the geological department."

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## A P P E N D I X

## MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 21 - 27 APRIL 1975

<u>Moscow (2768 items)</u>			<u>Peking (974 items)</u>		
Upcoming V-E Day 30th Anniversary	(7%)	9%	Korean President Kim Il-sung in PRC	(15%)	16%
Lenin Birth Anniversary	(--)	8%	Cambodia	(20%)	15%
Egyptian Foreign Minister Fahmi in USSR	(--)	7%	[Phnom Penh "Liberation"]	(17%)	11%
Cambodia	(6%)	5%	Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien in Pakistan	(--)	9%
1974 Portuguese Coup 1st Anniversary	(--)	4%	Belgium Prime Minister Tindemans in PRC	(3%)	9%*
Vietnam	(2%)	3%	Indochinese People's Summit 5th Anniversary	(--)	8%
China	(4%)	3%	Vietnam	(2%)	4%
Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam in USSR	(--)	3%			

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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\* This figure excludes brief reports on Mao Tse-tung's meeting with Tindemans.